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Introduction 
 
The question of ideological1 and political 
influence on science occasionally recurs in 
philosophy of science and scientific journalism, 
usually to attack pressure groups compromising 
the objective work of scientists or to describe the 
consequences of a given ideology–often 
religious–"winning" against scientific knowledge. 
However, to even enter a laboratory is to 
participate in ideological assumptions and material 
conditions–this point has also been discussed at 
length, usually by postmodern critics to 
"problematize" the sociological consequences of 
scientific findings. Between these poles a host of 
questions are raised which typically preoccupy 
philosophers of science, who have historically 
tried to give a prescriptive method for determining 
which scientific findings are "scientific" and 
which are not. Another perspective is that the 
approaches described above are simply not 
sufficient to describe the degree to which science 
in 20th and 21st century industrialized democracies 
is shaped by political, socioeconomic and 
ideological factors, and for this reason the late-20th 
century philosopher Paul Feyerabend and others2 
attempted to work out just what the relationship 
between ideology and science is, in practice. 
His publications Against Method, Science in a 
 
1 In this paper "ideology" refers to a set of beliefs or 
system of ideas informing a way of life–whether 
individual lives, that of a political party, or for societies 
at large–and that these beliefs shape the lives of people 
and their surroundings in conscious and unconscious 
ways. 
2 Among the late-20th century thinkers examining the 
sociological dimensions of scientific knowledge are 
those of the Edinburgh school–the "strong programme" 
provided by David Bloor and Donald Angus 
MacKenzie among others (and of which Feyerabend 
had a few criticisms)–which holds that all branches of 
human endeavor including the sciences emerged from 
and are therefore mediated by sociological factors. 
French sociologist Bruno Latour is another, who argues 
the examination of science in a sociological context has 
not yet transcended the "fact position"–that factors such 
as class, gender, psychology, and race can be invoked 
explain almost every aspect of human knowledge–or 
the "fairy position," which holds human efforts to 
understand the world are always inadequate projections 
onto the world (cf. Latour, 225-248). 
Free Society, Farewell to Reason, Conquest of 
Abundance and others have the consistent, 
overlapping thesis that science is too powerful to 
allow ideologies to control and that in order for 
truly free societies to flourish, ideology and 
science have to be uncoupled. An approach he 
offers to do this is an anarchist theory of 
knowledge–a standpoint which does not privilege 
one body of knowledge as more legitimate than 
others, so they can be tested against one another to 
find which maximize understanding of the world 
and which would only increase ignorance. 
Prioritizing the freedom of individuals and 
communities over "truth,"3 Feyerabend takes many 
measures to widen the gaps of certainty inside the 
domains of science and the ideologies which mold 
the world where science is conducted. 
Using Feyerabend's texts as a compass, as 
well as discussing those critics and authors who 
support some of his claims in other areas, this 
essay will explore: i) ways in which the enterprise 
of science is ideologicallydefined byitsverynature, 
ii) whether it has ever historically been that case 
that ideologies of some kind did not influence the 
work of scientists, and iii) whether the separation 
of ideology and science is possible. In 
approaching these questions, the merits of 
anarchist epistemology and other methods will be 
compared to examine science's role as a liberating 
social force in the way Feyerabend describes. 
Background 
 
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), an Austrian- 
born professor of philosophy who spent his 
prolific and controversial academic career in both 
European and American university faculties, 
authored many works discussing the philosophy of 
science and the sociological dimensions of science 
from the 1950s until his death, gaining popularity 
and notoriety in the 1970s. Because of the 
sometimes startling claims he makes in these 
works in order to provoke discussion he is still 
 
3 "[It] is of course not true that we have to follow the 
truth. Human life is guided by many ideas. Truth is one 
of them. Freedom and mental independence are others. 
If Truth, as conceived by some ideologists, conflicts 
with freedom, then we have a choice. We may abandon 
freedom. But we may also abandon Truth." Feyerabend, 
"How To Defend," 4. 
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considered a fringe figure in the philosophy of 
science, certainly by mainstream science 
journalists: 
 
Depending upon whom you read, 
Feyerabend is a 'cultural relativist,' 
'epistemological anarchist,' 'the Salvador 
Dali of philosophy,' 'the wild man of 
twentieth-century philosophy of science,' 
and–for one particularly expressive 
commentator–'the agent provocateur, the 
Shakespearean Fool, and the gifted 
charlatan all rolled into one.' The name 
'Feyerabend' conjures up an image of a 
philosophical trickster, wickedly willing 
to praise voodoo and astrology and 
demean science and reason.4 
 
Politically Feyerabend's works are interested in 
social equality and individual liberty while not 
subscribing  to  any  leftist  ideology  such  as 
socialism or liberalism, which are considered in 
his  pages  as  useful  "fairy  tales"  or  reductive 
models  of  reality. As  such  his  philosophical 
concerns developed through time to generally bear 
on the following–how to account for the success 
of scientific theories, the relationship of science 
and its application through technology   to 
sociological change, the political dimensions of 
science, and the stature of scientific knowledge 
compared to other forms. 
Because of his skepticism towards ideology, 
coupled with the fact that much of his work 
dispenses with mainstream and even radical 
models of scientific theory as insufficient 
caricatures, Feyerabend's stature as a reliable 
commentator on science has never been fully 
robust in academic circles.5 Nevertheless, "the 
call to take seriously the practical and political 
context of the scientific enterprise that earned 
Feyerabend his 'anarchistic' status is now 
honoured by a rich community of pluralist, 
feminist, political, and socially-engaged 
philosophies of science–even if only a few of them 
appreciate Feyerabend's status as a precursor of 
their interests and approaches."6 Certainly in terms 
of historical context, as a mid-to-late 20th century 
philosopher discussing the kinds of questions he 
does, Feyerabend's position in the schism between 
 
4   Brown and Kidd, 2. 
5 "The charge that Feyerabend's work involves a 
dangerous relativism and that it sanctions 'irrationalism' 
is widespread....Noting the 'playfulness' of much of 
Feyerabend's writings, some commentators even 
suggest that he is not a serious philosopher." Jary, 45. 
6   Brown and Kidd, 2. 
postmodernism and empiricism is of considerable 
interest. 
Reactions against Immanuel Kant's theory of 
knowledge7 which fuelled G. W. F. Hegel's system 
of philosophy in the early 19th century and the 
late-19th century philosophies of G. E. Moore and 
Bertrand Russell created a split in the continuum 
of philosophical priorities–the tradition of Hegel, 
by way of Marxism and German idealism, 
culminating in the "continental" school, and the 
tradition of Moore, Russell and later Ludwig 
Wittgenstein becoming the "analytic."8 Generally 
speaking, the province of analytic philosophy 
includes formal logic,  clarifying the nature of 
language, the terms of argument, and developing 
abstract, systematic descriptions of nature based 
on an empirical mode of knowledge. As a result 
the scope of analytic concerns fall squarely within 
the fields investigated by the natural sciences 
while the figures of continental philosophy, 
including Heidegger along with later social 
theorists like Adorno and Derrida, on the contrary 
reject the natural sciences' monopoly on 
knowledge in favor of more sociological and 
historicist methods.9 Though the fundamental 
content of these two traditions overlaps 
extensively, the methods of investigation in each 
is  traditionally  viewed  as  the  source  of  their 
 
 
 
 
7 Kant's theory of knowledge, integral to his 
philosophical system and explained in Critique of Pure 
Reason, can be summarized as follows–experience of 
the world is mediated by conceptual categories (heat, 
length, duration, etc.) inherent to the structure and 
activity of thought, and without these categories it 
would be impossible to relate to the world in a way 
recognizable to human beings. It is therefore not certain 
to what extent human experience of the world matches 
some reality outside of the mind or whether this outside 
reality can be said to exist. Hegel in Phenomenology of 
Mind, by contrast, claims that reality and the human 
mind include one another, reality and mind are an 
undivided whole, and this undivided whole (or 
"Absolute Mind") is everything that exists–therefore the 
human mind is always participating, knowingly or 
unknowingly, in unmediated relation with a reality that 
mirrors the structure of thought (a reality which cannot 
be said to be "outside" or "inside" the mind). Moore 
and Russell, in turn, reacted against Hegel in favor of 
common sense realism (the world more or less matches 
the way we perceive it through the senses). 
8    These  categorizations,  whatever   their   inherent 
problems or ambiguity–and there are many–are 
nevertheless broadly useful for discussing the history of 
20th century philosophy. (cf. Jones). 
9   Cutrofello, 1. 
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differences.10 Science, which in the postwar 
period became a dominant institutionalized mode 
of inquiry has consequently become a primary 
point of contention between the two spheres. 
Karl Popper, an Austrian-British philosopher 
whose thought drifted away from the certainties of 
the Marxist-continental school and was skeptical 
of the tenets of the analytic school, sought to 
describe the limits and potentials of scientific 
knowledge. His works The Open Society and Its 
Enemies and The Logic of Scientific 
Discoveryoffer discussions about science such as 
the distinction between "scientific" and 
"unscientific" theories as well as the complicated 
relationship between liberal democracy, 
philosophy, and science. Popper's main 
contribution to understanding the limits of 
scientific questions is falsification: 
 
Every genuine test of a theory is an 
attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. 
Testability is falsifiability; but there are 
degrees of testability: some theories are 
more testable, more exposed to refutation, 
than others; they take, as it were, greater 
risks....One can sum up all this by saying 
that the criterion of the scientific status of 
a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, 
or testability.11 
 
With this formulation, Popper attempted to 
simplify the  concerns  of science so as to not 
overlap with other disciplines whose questions 
cannot be answered with empirical observation. 
"Tomorrow you will meet the love of your life," 
for example, is an unfalsifiable prediction in 
comparison to "Two positively charged ions will 
repel one another" because it operates under a set 
of assumptions  which cannot be tested by 
observation and therefore lies outside the abilities 
or priorities of science.12 
 
10 "The employment of the term 'continental philosophy' 
arguably evolved historically in order for there to be 
some single thing to which analytic philosophy as a 
whole could be opposed...analytic philosophers 
specified for themselves what continental philosophy 
was, in effect, by thinking of it as an enormous garbage 
bin into which any...non-analytic form of post-Kantian 
philosophy was to be dumped" (Conant,17). 
11 Popper, Conjectures, 4. Note that falsification is 
intended to test the scientific quality of claims, not 
whether they are true or false. 
12 "[Popper's] aim is to develop a special point of view, 
to bring this point of view into logically acceptable 
form (which involves a considerable amount of rather 
pointless technicalities) and then to discuss everything 
in  its  terms....Not  the  ever-changing  demands  of 
The scientific method until this time had 
remained more or less unchanged from Francis 
Bacon's description in 1620 in Novum 
Organum–"not to deduce effects from effects, nor 
experiments from experiments...but in our 
capacity of legitimate interpreters of nature, to 
deduce causes and axioms from effects and 
experiments; and new effects and experiments 
from those causes and axioms."13 This 
understanding, based on inductive reasoning, set 
the criteria for scientific investigation as data 
collection and hypothesis without needing to suit 
any particular epistemic model. Popper, in 
suggesting that the work of science needs to 
additionally meet falsifiable standards provided by 
philosophy,14 claims the concerns of science are in 
fact epistemic rather than simply a 
disinterestedobservation of nature–in summary, 
"there is no pure, disinterested, theory-free 
observation."15 Science can be understood in this 
way to always be practised within a larger 
ideological framework (such as that provided by 
Popper himself with falsification), and it is here 
that Popper identifies ideology as the conduit for 
science's influence on society  and political 
influence on science. 
Challenging the apparent simplicityof Bacon's 
method, Popper raised questions about the 
rationale of scientific discovery which led to a 
flood of  works trying  to finesse or  refute his 
theories, among the most radical being those of 
Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Feyerabend. 
Parallel to this surge in philosophy of science was 
the growth of postmodernism, a set of intellectual 
attitudes critical of dominant narratives within the 
sciences, the arts, and humanities. Thanks to the 
academic affiliations of some postmodern thinkers 
and the attention Feyerabend and Kuhn drew to 
scientific theory in the wake of Popper's 
publications,16    postmodernism  from  the  1960s 
 
scientific research but the rigid requirements of an 
abstract rationalism decide about the form and the 
content of the principles accepted." Feyerabend, The 
Problems, 21. 
13  Bacon, Novum Organum, §117. 
14  A large part of the concerns of the philosophy of 
science, one might say its historical mission, is and has 
been to make these kinds of demands of the sciences. 
15 Popper, The Myth, 8. 
16 "With its influence in the academic world growing [in 
the mid-20th century], postmodernism was increasingly 
seen as the greatest metanarrative of all. A contributing 
factor was that scholars from the humanities 
increasingly encroached on other fields of knowledge, 
most controversially the natural sciences. After the 
theories of Paul Feyerabend and Thomas S. Kuhn had 
drawn attention to the social and cultural determination 
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onwards issued formidable disruptions to a 
cohesive theory of science as well as any supposed 
scientific objectivity. 
Feyerabend's Philosophy of Science 
 
It is within the historical context outlined 
above that Feyerabend surveys the interface of 
ideology  and  science.  Feyerabend  asserts  that 
"science  as  a  whole  is  founded  on  ideology. 
Particular scientific arguments may be free from it 
but the general framework of ideas in which the 
arguments  are  embedded...almost  always  has 
ideological ingredients."17     He adds that though 
this fact does not diminish the accomplishments of 
science, "[most scientists] simply accept the basic 
principles of their field and the evaluations that are 
built   into   them...without   a   single   unbiased 
examination of comparative successes and failures 
[with other fields]."18   Feyerabend believes this 
leads  to  a  kind  of  chauvinist  tunnel-vision. 
Various disciplines hold, in his view, that not only 
do their methods hold a monopoly on truths about 
the   world,   they   also   deserve   more   federal 
funding–"a  'real  world'  constructed  by special 
interest groups who use their own narrow values 
(and of course, their power) to confer unreality on 
any problem that might be perceived and even 
solved   within   a   different   approach."19      The 
ideological  prism  through   which   science  is 
conducted, he concludes, colors the seemingly 
objective scientific "facts" and "laws" to a degree 
which  cannot  be ignored  if  they are  to aid  a 
democratic pursuit and distribution of knowledge. 
Science being structured  in its very 
foundations   by   ideology   has   a   number   of 
consequences,  and  knowing  this  Feyerabend 
developed an anarchist interpretation of 
knowledge within–or in reaction to–philosophies 
of science which he felt did not examine this 
particular issue closely enough. 
He sketches out a system of critiques toward 
the idea that any method based on "firm, 
unchanging, and absolutely binding principles" 
can be shown to accurately reflect the historical 
conditions which have shaped the sciences. He 
further denies that such an idea will engender 
 
 
 
of scientific practice, there were a number of studies 
focusing on the sociological aspects of science, on the 
nature of scientific texts...and the general relationship 
between science and society and culture." Böhnke, 36. 
17 Feyerabend, "Science and Ideology," 154. 
18 Ibid. 155. 
19 Ibid. 
progress within fields of research in the future.20 
Anarchism, in Feyerabend's use, is "not to replace 
one set of general rules by another such set: my 
intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all 
methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have 
their limits."21 Additionally, his use of anarchism 
is not exactly an extension of political anarchy but 
emulates its rejection of totalizing theories in 
favor of a plurality–in order to be a force for good 
in the world, the sciences cannot be the 
specialized domain of an initiated few but, as 
much as possible, a self-policing democratic 
activity encouraging many perspectives.22 
Feyerabend argues further that science is an 
"anarchistic enterprise," its breakthroughs 
proceeding not byphilosophically-prescribed rules 
or methods but through scientists experimenting 
and rejecting modes of thinking which would 
restrict their freedom to know. The only general 
principle applying to science in all historical 
periods, he estimates, has been that "anything 
goes"23–"the events and results that constitute the 
sciences have no common structure; there are no 
elements that occur in every scientific 
investigation."24 He claims the version of science 
that "persists in large and well-financed 
institutions...that underlies science instruction at 
all levels, advanced seminars included"25–that is, 
a picture of science or "the scientific method" as a 
uniform intellectual activity instead of a 
heterogeneous family of historically-and- 
culturally-bound practices–is a useful myth only 
for "metaphysicians, schoolmasters and politicians 
trying to make their nation competitive."26 
Acknowledging the sciences as existing within a 
political framework of this kind, Feyerabend 
examines the ways in which ideology shapes the 
knowledge produced by research. 
 
20 Feyerabend, Against Method,14. For science to move 
forward believing in a uniform, trustworthy method it 
must be ignorant of  its own historical process–cf. 
Alfred North Whitehead: "If science is not to 
degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypothesis, it 
must…enter upon a thorough criticism of  its own 
foundations" (18). 
21 Ibid. 
22 This particular aspect of Feyerabend's thought is not 
well-developed; exactly what this world would look 
like is left vague. It would not mis-characterize his 
views to say that Feyerabend would consider 
democratic control over the sciences' interaction with 
the state would be better and safer than corporate 
control. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Feyerabend, Farewell, 281. 
25 "Science and Ideology," 157. 
26   Against Method, 249. 
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Ideology and Science 
 
Feyerabend identifies rationalism as a central 
belief determining the conduct of the sciences and 
their place in Western democracy, and as an 
ancient Greek "attempt to transcend, devalue, and 
push aside complex forms  of thought and 
experience."27 Rationalism is an attitude towards 
knowledge that privileges deduction, logic, and 
abstract reasoning in general as the primary mode 
of verifying what humans perceive through the 
senses, doubting as a result that the world as it is 
perceived is an entirely "truthful" representation. 
René Descartes' 1637 Discourse on Method is an 
attempt to deal with this apparent disconnect, 
becoming in the process a foundational work 
describing the method of rationalism: 
 
...never to accept anything for true which 
I did not clearly know to be such...to 
divide each of the difficulties under 
examination into as many parts as 
possible, and as might be necessary for its 
adequate solution...to conduct my 
thoughts in such order that, by 
commencing with objects the simplest 
and easiest to know, I might ascend by 
little and little, and, as it were, step by 
step, to the knowledge of the more 
complex ... in every case to make 
enumerations so complete, and reviews so 
general, that I might be assured that 
nothing was omitted. ...[T]here is nothing 
so far removed from us as to be beyond 
our reach, or so hidden that we cannot 
discover it, provided only we abstain from 
accepting the false for the true, and 
always preserve in our thoughts the order 
necessary for the deduction of one truth 
from another.28 
 
This reduction and compartmentalizing of 
experience into knowable parts is, as Feyerabend 
mentions, part of the Greco-Roman tradition's 
influence on modern Western societies—it 
distinguishes "between a 'real world' and a 'world 
of appearances'. [As ancient rationalists] presented 
the matter, the real world was simple, uniform, 
subjected to stable universal laws and the same for 
all."29 He identifies rationalist reductions of nature 
as a characteristic of Western thought going as far 
back as pre-Socratics like Heraclitus and 
Parmenides. 
 
27   Farewell to Reason, 65. 
28  Descartes, Discourse on Method, Ch. 2, Para. 7-11. 
29  Feyerabend, "Knowledge and the Role," 167. 
Rationalism exercises an influence on the 
sciences and how they are understood that is hard 
to overstate. For example, in what way does a 
formula like H2O–describing the atomic properties 
of water, ice and steam–correspond with nature? 
To say "water is H2O" says nothing of wetness, 
temperature, how light interacts with it, its various 
uses or anything else, only what it is when reduced 
to its chemical constituents. That the formula 
"H2O" corresponds to water, or that the word 
"water" corresponds to a clear, odorless, drinkable 
substance depends on a reductive identity of a 
natural phenomenon to a set of readily-knowable 
characteristics. It, in short, does not correspond to 
nature at all but presents a model by which nature 
can be known without direct observation. In still 
fewer words, it is true by definition. Thanks to 
reductive models like equations and theorems a 
scientist can in practice "know" an aspect of 
nature independent of experience, and when faced 
with the baroque abundance of the universe can 
identify water whether it is liquid, solid or a gas 
because the number of atoms is the same. When 
asked what the atoms look like, an answer could 
only be given in the form of more models.30 
 
In this sense rationalism is very useful to 
scientific theories and necessary for many. 
Without it concepts like the speed of light would 
be impossible–in order to achieve a high-level 
generalization like "light always travels at 
approximately 3.00 x 108 m/s in a vacuum, we 
will denote this with c," the variety of possible 
experience and diversity of phenomena have to be 
made very abstract. Mathematics, the notation 
system by which phenomena are made reducible 
and abstractly knowable, operates under a set of 
assumptions inconceivable without the "real 
world-world of appearances" split–"it appears that 
necessary truths, such as we find in pure 
mathematics and particularly in arithmetic and 
geometry,  must  have  principles  whose  proof 
 
30 "Modern elementary particle experiments have 
pushed this aspect to an extreme. Here we have entire 
cities, watched around the clock...their intestines 
protected from undesirable influences while their active 
parts produce events that cannot be seen, not even in 
principle, but are recorded and interpreted by complex 
and highly sophisticated instruments....Examples such 
as these show very clearly that modern science uses 
artifacts*, not Nature as She is....[We] infer that the 
final product, i.e., nature as described by our scientists, 
is also an artifact." Feyerabend, The Conquest, 238. 
*By "artifact" Feyerabend is describing models as opposed 
to some direct, immediate apprehending of objective truth, 
that is, we are to understand "elementary particles" and 
"nature" in this passage as reductive models rather than 
"real" entities. 
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doesn't depend on instances (or, therefore, on the 
testimony of the senses), even though without the 
senses it would never occur to us to think of 
them.…Euclid understood this so well that he 
demonstrated by reason things that experience and 
sense-images make very evident."31 It is with these 
abstract methods that the rationalist probes the 
world of appearances–a set of clues–for 
underlying unity which can be represented in 
formulas and theories which will hold true in spite 
of time, space or circumstance. 
Through abstraction, additionally, the idea of 
scientific "laws" and "facts" is possible. 
Feyerabend believes these ideas stretch the limits 
of the doable, noting "abstract theories or models 
compare projections (i.e., stereotypical 
perceptions stripped of many peculiar aspects) to 
projections (i.e., streamlined inferences of 
consequences from the theories or models). The 
match between them is an artificial construction, 
often made to fit using ad hoc interpretations."32 
In other words, the extent to which a physical law 
can be said to correspond with nature–like "H2O" 
corresponding to "water"–is at the level of 
representation, or of a model, not a clairvoyant 
uncovering of its unchanging essence.33 
 
The law of gravity, for example, is a 
way of understanding a diverse array of 
phenomena–falling bodies–without 
observing them individually or directly. 
There is no doubting that this is useful for 
the purposes of scientific understanding. 
Feyerabend does not deny that rationalist 
models of nature serve the work of 
scientists exceptionally well, he only 
acknowledges that a map is not the same 
as the territory it illustrates.34 
 
31   Leibniz, New Essays, I, 3. 
32  Feyerabend, Conquest, 138. 
33 Cf. W.V.O. Quine: "The totality of our so-called 
knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of 
geography and history to the profoundest laws of 
atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, 
is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience 
only along the edges" (29). Quine holds that there can 
be no isolated test of a scientific hypothesis–empirical 
investigations are always occurring within some 
established theory of knowledge about the world or 
conditions one is observing. Further, the truth of any 
statement (i.e. "I am holding my hand in front of me") 
can be evaluated by itself, only as part of a larger set of 
statements (cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty). 
This position is known as confirmation holism, or the 
Duhem-Quine thesis. 
34 Alfred Korzybski also, famously, points out that "the 
map is not the territory" to demonstrate that such tools 
as language and mathematics, being representations 
According to Feyerabend rationalism is also at 
the heart of political ideologies like liberalism, 
which regards the rationalist picture, coinciding 
"with science," as "not just one view among 
many, but as the basis of a society."35 He uses the 
example of anthropology, which emphasizes "the 
psychological meaning, the social functions, the 
existential temper" of other cultures while 
considering "...oracles, rain dances, the treatment 
of mind and body [as expressing] the needs of the 
members of the society,...a social glue". Liberal 
anthropologists throughout history have 
acknowledged a people's need for these rituals 
without granting them "an accompanying 
knowledge of distant events, rain, mind, body."36 
Feyerabend believes this dissection of "non- 
scientific" cultures is harmful to the preservation 
and legitimizing of their traditions and 
worldviews, leading to an indirect or direct 
dismissal of their way of life as unadvanced. The 
teleological view that indigenous rituals are proto- 
science or magical thinking would make 
indigenous cultures a problem to be solved with 
modernization, absorbing them, in Feyerabend's 
estimation, into the tradition "of the White Man" 
curing them of superstition.37 
Empiricism is another ideology characterizing 
modern science, which Feyerabend considers 
parallel to rationalist, or "theoretical" traditions: 
 
...rationalism did not introduce order 
where before there was chaos and 
ignorance; it introduced a special kind of 
order, established by special procedures, 
and different from the order and the 
procedures of historical traditions. The 
theoretical approach had results in fields 
such as astronomy and mathematics. In 
the Republic, 530ff,  Plato advised  the 
astronomers to construct abstract models 
and to 'disregard things in the heavens'. 
Those following the advice succeeded 
beyond expectations. But the success 
could not be foreseen and, besides, it did 
not immediately lead to better numerical 
values    than,    say,    the    Babylonian 
 
removed from the world they describe, do not 
correspond 1:1 with the world human beings inhabit. 
Arthur Schopenhauer extends this when he writes that 
a person "does not know a sun and an earth, but only an 
eye that sees the sun, a hand that feels an earth" (World 
As Will and Representation 3). In the rationalist picture, 
there is no direct apprehension by humans of a world as 
it is. 
35   Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, 76. 
36   Ibid. 77. 
37   Ibid. 76. 
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predictions which rested on different and 
more empirical principles.38 
 
Empiricism favors observation and understanding 
of particulars in the manner Francis Bacon 
described over purely abstract models, though it 
overlaps with rationalism and many foundational 
rationalist philosophers such as Descartes have 
outlined empirical scientific methods. Because 
observation and data gathering are key to this form 
of knowledge, empirical approaches to science are 
generally more accepting of the relationship 
between the senses–or instruments which extend 
the reach of the senses like microscopes–and the 
outside world, and that here is an "outside world" 
to observe. In this respect we might say a "pure" 
empiricism and a "pure" rationalism diverge from 
one another, but as Feyerabend mentions, "the 
discovery of irrational numbers; the semantic 
paradoxes; the difficulties of the theory of ideas; 
the sense-reason problem; the mind-body problem, 
and so on" have contributed in history to a partial 
return from pure rationalism to more empirically- 
grounded scientific models. 
Even so, Feyerabend describes a fundamental 
problem of the empirical tradition lying in "the 
idea that experience might be a basis for our 
knowledge [being] at once removed by the remark 
that '[t]here must be discussion to show how 
experience is to be interpreted.'"39 Here he takes 
his frequent touchstone, John Stuart Mill's 1859 
work On Liberty as a valid critique of empiricism. 
In it, Mill continues–"few facts are able to tell 
their own story, without comments to bring out 
their meaning....In the case of any person whose 
judgment is really deserving of confidence, how 
has it become so?"40 Mill is making a statement 
here that calls Popper to mind, that there is no 
observation or theory which is not lensed by some 
higher structure. From this the question may be 
asked "What makes an empirical observation 
deserving of confidence?" 
Materialism may be called the higher structure 
grounding empiricism whereas idealism may be 
called the same for rationalism–in the former, 
stemming from Democritus, reality is purely 
physical and tangible, with things like "mind" and 
"emotion" being products of physical interactions. 
In the latter, stemming from Plato, reality is 
ultimately mental and abstract, with the physical 
universe becoming a low-definition product of the 
senses. Empirical observation would regard 
idealism as an unnecessary step, seeing "evidence" 
 
38  Feyerabend, The Problems of Empiricism, 9. 
39   Ibid. 67. 
40   Mill, 23. 
for Plato's idealism, such as the idea of "perfect 
triangles" as reducible to the human brain's ability 
for pattern recognition, for example. This appears 
to be a common-sense enough attitude, and by 
reducing reality this way a number of favorable 
results can and have been achieved. However, to 
paraphrase Feyerabend, to justify any theory of 
knowledge by the results it produces "counts in its 
favour only if these results were achieved by [that 
theory] alone, and without any outside help" 
pointing out further that "ideological pressures... 
make us listen to [one theory] to the exclusion of 
everything else."41 These ideological pressures are 
social, political and economic in nature and are 
part of determining prevailing theories "to the 
extent to which any political...group is permitted 
to influence society."42 Therefore the "truth" of a 
theory of knowledge–materialist, idealist or 
otherwise–depends on the dominant ideology of a 
society.43 
When this is acknowledged, Feyerabend 
considers the society at an epistemological 
crossroads–either embracing the dominant 
ideology (which can include a spread through 
colonization), embracing relativism, where 
"traditions not only have no well-defined 
boundaries...[enabling] their members to think and 
act as if no boundaries existed: potentially every 
tradition is all traditions,"44 or embracing cultural 
pluralism. In all cases, "decisions concerning the 
value and use of science are not scientific 
decisions; they are decisions to live, think, feel, 
and behave in a certain way."45 The sciences then 
become ideologically defined from the outside, 
and it is here where the danger lies spurring 
Feyerabend to call for "a formal separation 
between state and science."46 
He illustrates this point in part by discussing 
the  situations  within  which  the  sciences  are 
 
41   "How to Defend," 8-9. 
42   Ibid. 9. 
43 Consider the Soviet republics making the "dialectical 
materialist" view of the world and history into an 
official policy to the exclusion of religious institutions 
and alternatives to socialist economic theories. cf. 
Bernard Wills, describing the Enlightenment 
conception: "[for] modern science (leaving aside the 
question of post-modern science) being is assumed…to 
be inert passivity described through the model of a 
machine whose parts are externally related." This 
concept of nature is opposed to mythos, the religious 
model of being as participating fundamentally within a 
cosmic narrative rather than as the blind flowing of 
matter (58). 
44  Conquest of Abundance,143. 
45 Farewell to Reason, 30. 
46   "How to Defend," 9. 
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expected to work in some industrialized 
democracies–"Government scientists redefine 
their problems when a new administration comes 
along...scientists working on defence contracts 
adapt their approach to the changing political and 
defence climate, ecologists follow public needs, 
computer technologists [switch] their priorities 
with every flicker of the market."47  In a way this 
is obvious, and a common complaint from parties 
wanting to defend the work of scientists from 
policies viewed as oppressive or anti-intellectual. 
In the 21st century particularly there has been a 
vehement championing of science as a safe 
harbour for reason in an unstable global 
community overrun by religious fanatics and 
plutocratic businesspeople threatening science's 
methods.48 In a 2006 editorial for Nature titled 
"Science Under Attack," discussing the Bush 
administration's policies regarding science as 
exerting "tighter control of the branches of 
government where scientists work," the editorial 
staff claims that for "science to flourish it needs 
settings that support freedom of enquiry, and the 
creation of such settings was a great achievement 
of the Enlightenment. Protecting them is vital, not 
just for science but for all of humanity."49 
American conservative institutions are often a 
target for these criticisms. In a 1999 interview, 
Noam Chomsky  replied to the Kansas public 
school policy against teaching natural selection as 
"another long step in the project of redesigning the 
school curriculum in ways that will reduce the 
possibility of students having the intellectual tools 
to escape the fundamentalist fanaticism that the 
designers of the new curriculum prefer."50 
Chomsky views criticism of science from leftist 
circles, more diffuse throughout Western 
university faculties, as also fallacy-ridden even if 
its political influence is less powerfully felt: 
 
[Science] is dominated by "the white male 
gender." It is "limited by cultural, racial 
and gender biases," and "establishes and 
perpetuates social organization [with] 
hidden political, social and economic 
purposes." "The majority in the South has 
 
47   Farewell to Reason, 41. 
48    The  bibliographies  of  "New  Atheist"  authors 
Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins 
attest to this, raising the post-9/11 political climate to a 
Ragnarök between the forces of science and the forces 
of religion radical or not, along with internet-popular 
science educators Neil Degrasse Tyson and Bill Nye, 
whose  many  debates  with  hapless  apologists  for 
religion and creationism are an instructive spectacle. 
49 "Science Under Attack," 891. 
50  Chomsky, On Democracy and Education, 98. 
waited for the last four hundred years for 
compassionate humane uses of [science]," 
which is "outside and above the 
democratic process."...Conclusion: there 
is "something inherently wrong" with 
[science]. We must reject or transcend 
it.... Furthermore, [science] "claims to a 
monopoly of knowledge." It thus denies, 
say, that I know how to tie my shoes ... 51 
 
Chomsky views these criticisms, along with 
postmodern and poststructuralist criticisms, as 
making a few potentially true criticisms nested in 
many mistaken assumptions about the "science" 
they target, while dismissing "dedicated, serious 
and often successful efforts to overcome 
traditional exclusiveness and privilege" in 
university science and engineering faculties.52 He 
concludes that these criticisms provide no equally 
substantial alternative to the sciences as they are 
currently practiced, and that the political 
ideologies mediating science's image within public 
and educational institutions undeniably take many 
forms across the spectrum. 
Faced with a diversity of competing political 
perspectives, relativism is often given as a 
solution. Feyerabend sees "relativism," similarly 
to "science," as an array of attitudes rather than a 
uniform node. He describes relativism as a threat 
to modern intellectuals–"just as the enlightenment 
once threatened the existence of theologians and 
priests"53–as practically synonymous with 
"democratic judgement."54 Relativism presents its 
own difficulties but categorically rejecting it 
presents "others, since competing theories do not 
necessarily have to duel one another for the upper 
hand–according to ancient skeptics like Sextus 
Empiricus, for example, "if opposing views can be 
shown to be equally strong...then there is no need 
to worry about them."55 It is through a dogmatic 
projection of false dilemmas onto conflicts (ie. 
only one perspective in a debate can be correct) 
that there arises the need for "objective truth," an 
aim assumed throughout the sciences by reasons 
explained above to be possible and necessary.56 
 
51  Chomsky, "Rationality/Science." 
52 Ibid. Employment statistics in the science and 
engineering fields may say otherwise. 
53   Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, 79-80. 
54   Ibid. 86. 
55  Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason, 76. 
56 The assumption, if an implicit one, of an objective 
outside world is a practical necessity for 
engineering–calculations needed to land a rocket on the 
Moon would not need to be so exact if the rocket and 
the Moon were social constructs or phantoms of the 
mind (see the footnote on Quine above). 
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F e y e r a b e n d d e s c r i b e s c r i t i c s o f 
relativism–including Popper, who asserts it is a 
"theory that the choice between two competing 
theories is arbitrary"57–as ignoring natural 
diversity, where each "division, phylum, species 
developed its own way of being in a world" as 
well as "the disasters created by attempts to 
enforce a uniform way of life" when cultures come 
into contact.58 For Feyerabend, questions about 
objective truth are not only a matter of ivory-tower 
philosophizing but have fatal consequences when 
groups enforce this claim to objective truth, a 
"right way," with violence and oppressive 
socioeconomic structures–it is "not about 
concepts...but about human relations."59 
Imperialist Science 
 
It is through colonialism and imperialism that 
the ideologies and cultural attitudes structuring 
the sciences have had fatal legacies elsewhere on 
humanity.   Certainly   post-colonial   indigenous 
critics attest to this–Temagami critic Dale Turner, 
examining the 21st century situation for indigenous 
Canadian citizens, writes "the very ways we frame 
the language of rights, sovereignty and 
nationalism" in regards to indigenous peoples are 
"steeped in colonialism....[Any] special political 
lights aboriginal communities may possess can be 
subsumed  within  already  existing  Eurocentric 
political  theories  of  justice."60 "White  Paper 
liberalism was offered as a way for Aboriginal 
peoples to participate more equitably in day-to- 
day Canadian society, but it is not the kind of 
participation Aboriginal peoples are demanding."61 
After   the   violent   generations   of   colonizing 
indigenous  lands  and  subjecting  the  surviving 
peoples to dehumanizing conditions,62   the legal 
and political structures an aboriginal person is 
 
57   Farewell to Reason, 80. 
58   Ibid. 77. 
59   Ibid. 83. 
60   Turner, 95-96. 
61 Ibid. 97. The "White Paper" in question is a 1969 
proposal under the Trudeau government to abolish the 
oppressive Indian Act, in the process eliminating 
"Indian status" from aboriginal peoples leaving them 
legally vulnerable in the midst of racist political 
structures. Many aboriginal citizens felt at the time it 
was "yet another  manifestation of European 
colonialism...unilaterally legislating aboriginal peoples 
into extinction" (Turner, 12). 
62    The  land  rights  controversies  surrounding  the 
Muskrat Falls and Mactaquac dam building projects in 
Atlantic Canada are just two out of many examples of 
corporate and government interests serving to continue 
the colonial agenda under a modern guise. 
expected to live inside today–structures finding 
their source in Euro-American philosophies–still 
alienate and diminish their self-determination in 
predominantly white society. Imperialism, 
described by Maori critic Linda Tuhiwai Smith as 
"a complex ideology...[located] within the 
Enlightenment which signalled the transformation 
of economic, political and cultural life in Europe," 
is an integral part of "the development of the 
modern state, of science, of ideas and of the 
'modern' human person."63 As such, imperialism 
exerts its influence in the 21st century through 
concepts like "the individual," which make 
modern democracy possible, permeating the social 
imagination to an extent that alternatives–such as 
those found in indigenous conceptions of 
personhood–are hard justify on imperialism's own 
terms.64 
Under this perspective, the imperialist 
ingredient to the Western Enlightenment tradition 
has made knowledge something "there to be 
discovered, extracted, appropriated and 
distributed"65 like a raw material resource, like 
South American gold carried by a Spanish galleon 
awaiting refinement by more exacting theories of 
knowledge. Conquered peoples have historically 
been the targets of this predatory thirst. An 
example of this is the "rescuing" of artifacts by 
Western researchers and wealthy hobbyists from 
"decay and destruction, and from indigenous 
peoples themselves, [legitimated] practices which 
also included  commercial trade and plain and 
simple theft."66 More than this, "the development 
of scientific thought, the exploration and 
'discovery' by Europeans of new worlds...the 
globalization of knowledge and Western culture 
reaffirms the West's view of itself as the centre of 
 
63   Tuhiwai Smith, 23. 
64 "The individual, as the basic unit from which other 
social organizations and...relations form, is another 
system of ideas which needs to be understood as part of 
the West's* cultural archive...[the] individual can be 
distanced, or separated, from the physical environment, 
the community....Both imperial and colonial rule were 
systems of rule which stretched from the centre 
outwards to places which were far and distant. Distance 
again separated the individuals in power from the 
subjects they governed." (Tuhiwai Smith, 50, 58). 
*in this context meaning 'as opposed to indigenous or 
non-European.' Marshall McLuhan, working as much 
within the Eurocentric tradition as he could be said to 
be working outside or around it, notes in The 
Gutenberg Galaxy that the individual is the historical 
product of reproducible printed texts–a transmitter of 
knowledge privileged over more "tribal" oral 
transmission. 
65 Tuhiwai Smith, 61. 
66   Ibid. 64. 
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legitimate knowledge:"67 
 
In the nineteenth century the scientific 
drive assumed that there were universal 
models of human society and human 
nature, and that societies deemed to be 
more primitive could contribute to science 
by showing the most simple, most 
fundamental systems of social 
organization...While Western theories and 
academics were describing, defining and 
explaining cultural demise, indigenous 
peoples were having their land and 
resources systematically stripped by the 
state; were becoming ever more 
marginalized; and were subjected to the 
layers of colonialism imposed through 
economic and social policies.68 
 
It is not through some careful comparison and 
contrast with indigenous knowledge that Western 
science, in such manifestations as medicine, has 
been shown to reflect reality more closely, but 
through simple force and economic subjugation. 
Along with murdering swathes of the population, 
cutting off younger generations of indigenous 
persons from their community's ideology through 
missionary re-education–learning the  "master 
language" as Feyerabend calls it69–and conversion 
to the colonial religion, the colonists reinforce 
their ideology, which includes their sciences, as 
the norm. 
As with the White Paper example above, 
proponents of liberalism and neoliberalism, with 
their individualist and rationalist foundations, 
have historically seen few theoretical problems in 
absorbing an individual from one community (an 
aboriginal group) into a new one (a capitalist 
democracy) without drastic damage being done,70 
67   Ibid. 66. 
68   Ibid. 90. 
69  Feyerabend, Farewell, 81. 
70 The Liberal government under Louis St. Laurent's 
repeal of the Indian Act in 1951 left childcare of 
aboriginal communities in the hands of provincial 
governments, leading to the "Sixties Scoop," a 
widespread adoption of aboriginal children by white 
families throughout Canada ending in the 1980s. 
Instrumental to ending this was Judge Edwin 
Kimelman's appointing of a committee whose 1984 
report determined theseadoptions of aboriginal children 
by out-of-province white citizens was systematic 
cultural genocide. cf. Arthur Milner, "The Sixties 
Scoop thirty years later," Inroads 10 (2001), 164; 
Manitoba Community Services, "No Quiet Place, Final 
Report of the Review Committee on Indian and Métis 
Adoptions and Placements to the Minister of 
Community Services," Winnipeg (1995). 
even if they have not done the actual colonizing 
themselves.71 Existing within these modern 
political structures, indigenous peoples are still 
trying to decolonize and restore their bodies of 
knowledge, not only for cultural identity but for 
political autonomy and the health of its 
populations–returning to the example of Canada, 
"[contemporary] relations between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Canadian state are founded on a 
racialized ideology, which continues to support 
the tenets of colonialism....The health-related, 
systems-level determinants resulting from [the 
Indian Act] are far-reaching and influence almost 
every aspect of First Nations peoples' 
lives...systematic discrimination from resources 
and opportunities may well be interpreted as a 
form of structural violence."72 For an indigenous 
community to actually function in a post-colonial 
society,  the  autonomy to determine  their  own 
" h ou s ing . . . p r ogr ams an d se rv ices . . . 
infrastructure...and health systems"73 by and for 
themselves like any other community is necessary. 
This includes, where it is needed, restoring 
indigenous healing traditions which have 
been"explored, researched, refined, and perfected" 
by indigenous peoples for "millennia."74 
Colonization of the sort characterizing the 
Age of Discovery is a glaring example of 
imperialism and a stark illustration of the callous 
extremes ideology can reach. In the late-20th to 
21st centuries colonial oppression is not only still 
felt by those who live in former European colonies 
but entirely modern forms of colonization are 
spread through globalist laissez-faire economic 
practices by dominant industrial centers such as 
the United States and parts of Europe. These are 
aided–and one might argue it is no coincidence–by 
heavily interventionist foreign policies by these 
countries  with  a  view  to  installing  capitalist 
 
 
71 Of course there has been progress since the 1960s 
considering aboriginal rights, though at this stage it is 
hard to say how far it has come. This attitude towards 
the amorphous individual also extends to interventionist 
foreign policies which operate, if not consciously then 
certainly in practice, under the assumption that the end 
flourishing of every state is a capitalist liberal 
democracy and anything other is somewhere between 
a formidable, threatening alternative (the Soviet Union 
in the Cold War) and a barbaric junta oppressing its 
people (hostile Middle Eastern states, military 
dictatorships throughout Africa)–that the transition for 
the people in these states to a new way of life will be 
natural. 
72   Reading, 9. 
73   Ibid. 9-10. 
74  Steinhauer and Lamouche; Ibid.152. 
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governments in unstable sovereign states.75 
Domestically, corporate and government interests 
are constantly at variance with indigenous self- 
determination as with examples like the Lower 
Churchill Project in Muskrat Falls, Labrador and 
the Dakota Access Pipeline. 
Francis Fukuyama, assessing neoliberalism as 
exemplified by the United States in his 1992 work 
The End of History and the Last Man as the 
culmination of human history and the final stage 
of political development–the way which "works" 
being capitalist democracy, borne out by the end 
of the Cold War–assumes along with many 
neoliberals and neoconservatives that 
Enlightenment or Constitutional ideals thrive 
through the free market. This assumption 
influences a teleology lying behind notions of 
"developed nations" and "technological 
advancement" which the sciences are used to 
facilitate. The imperialism still permeating global 
relations remains paternal, that formerly or 
currently oppressed peoples can be made whole 
from the outside rather than allowing them some 
independence to develop along their own paths, 
letting their equality be more than "equality…to 
access one particular tradition" i.e. industrialized 
democracies and Western capital.76 
Finally, political ideology shapes the sciences 
materially–space telescopes, nuclear fission 
reactors, gene sequencing laboratories and so on 
cost money, and more than most individual 
scientists doing the research are able to spend. A 
technology such as the internet77 would not have 
been possible under its originating historical 
conditions without military-funded laboratories in 
large-scale facilities like MIT and Santa Monica 
University, and even the federally-funded Apollo 
programs would not have been possible without 
corporate manufacturing contractors like Boeing. 
Even in comparatively rare cases like the SpaceX 
program which are funded by private persons, to 
some extent or another the interests of the 
financier–somewhat like a Renaissance art 
patron–will influence the kinds of  research 
conducted and the lengths to which that research 
 
 
75 The Reagan administration's covert sponsorship of 
the anti-communist Nicaraguan Contras in the late 
1980s, and the Nixon administration's disruption of the 
Vietnamese Paris peace accords before extending war 
in the area for the next five years, are just two 
examples. 
76    Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, 76. 
77 The logic frameworks the internet uses were 
developed before the actual hardware designed through 
ARPANET was available, this hardware is what is 
being referred to. 
can reach.78 This is not to mention the legal 
dimension built into the state-science network, 
since even a very wealthy person will run into 
considerable difficulty acquiring the necessary 
equipment to replicate the Saturn V rocket due to 
the classified technical data used by aerospace 
engineering firms. 
Whole bodies of knowledge can more or less 
live or die by a bottom line mentality depending 
on expenses needed to explore them being 
justified,79 and in the case of the environment this 
has and will continue to have catastrophic 
results–a paleontologist whose expertise can be 
used to find exploitable oil deposits will be 
deemed a much more valuable scientist, and one 
more deserving of research grants, than a 
paleontologist whose interest is in displaying 
Devonian placoderm fossils for public education. 
In too many cases, when lucrative funding is 
involved, scientists are simply employees working 
out the logistical  wrinkles of expensive 
engineering feats rather than primarily exploring, 
the faithful interpreters of nature envisioned by 
Bacon. These noble pursuits are often peripheral 
to the work at the hand.80 At least to the extent 
that science is always done in a set of 
socioeconomic conditions determined through 
political relations and allocated funds in similarly 
unpredictable circumstances, ideologies of some 
kind have always been entwined with the 
enterprise of science and this coiling together 
suffuses its theoretical foundations almost 
completely, as has been shown. 
Separating Ideology and Science 
 
It is in light of this that Feyerabend denies the 
ability of philosophies of science to prescribe or 
describe   any   "scientific    method"    which 
 
78 This is not to say the motives behind wealthy entities 
funding science are always somehow sinister or merely 
materialist–only to state the mundane case that unless 
they are charitable, the patrons of a laboratory, like 
movie producers, are making an investment they would 
likely like to see returned in the future. 
79 Another mundane fact to include for the sake of 
completeness is that of course many bodies of research 
which serve no political purpose have very sufficient 
funding behind them, we are only concerned with 
potentially hazardous ones since no social or 
environmental danger would be posed by a non- 
invasive study of freshwater grasses. 
80  "[The] uneven distribution of funds, national 
rivalries, fear of accusations (of malpractice, 
plagiarism, waste of funds, etc.) put restrictions on 
what some dreamers, many philosophers among 
them, still regard as a 'free intellectual adventure'" 
(Feyerabend, Against Method, 247). 
76 Feyerabend on Science Cameron 76 
 
  
 
definitively divides the "scientific" from 
"pseudoscience," or provide any account of 
scientific progress which justifies internal 
consistency between one groundbreaking 
discovery and another–that Thales, Galileo and 
Jane Goodall have some essential continuity 
binding them rather than using ingenuity within a 
given network of historically-contingent 
assumptions shaped by the socioeconomic 
conditions of their respective day. In his 
perspective science is not a gradual demystifying 
of truths that have always existed–clouded by 
historical and cultural conditions and one day, 
with the right methods, finally uncovered and 
fully known–but simply a family of tools for 
understanding particular problems within 
particular contexts. He contends if any continuity 
binds "science" as a static ahistorical idea, it is not 
that of a "scientific method"–or falsifiability or 
even, as Thomas Kuhn describes, revolutionary 
shifts in science's conceptual bases81–but of 
individuals thinking laterally through problems 
using whatever means are available.82 That 
science has achieved certain results does not show 
that it is a particularly authoritative method of 
knowing the world–and scientists are aware they 
are most often producing tentative, falsifiable 
models rather than static "facts"–only that it has 
been the most expedient solution to a certain 
domain of questions posed under certain restraints: 
 
81 Feyerabend explains his position towards Kuhn's 
philosophy of science, as contained in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, in the following way: "Kuhn 
says that 'the difficulties that have seemed to undermine 
the authority of science should not be simply seen as 
observed facts about its practice. Rather they are 
necessary characteristics of any developmental or 
evolutionary process.' But how do we know that science 
is an evolutionary process rather than a static way of 
finding more facts and better laws? Either from 
'observed facts about its practice' or frominterpretations 
that are imposed from the outside. In the first case we 
are back at the situation Kuhn wants to overcome while 
the second case means that science is being 
incorporated into a wider (cultural) context–a context 
that values developments–and is interpreted 
accordingly (the procedure I mentioned in parentheses 
above). It seems that is what Kuhn really wants, i.e. he 
wants to settle the question philosophically, not by 
appealing to facts. I would agree if I knew that for him 
this is one way among many and not the only possible 
procedure" (Against Method, 271). 
82 "The consistency condition which demands that new 
hypotheses agree with accepted theories is 
unreasonable because it preserves the older theory, and 
not the better theory....There is no idea, however 
ancient or absurd, that is not capable of improving our 
knowledge" (Against Method, 5). 
the "word 'science' may be a single word–but there 
is no single entity that corresponds to that word."83 
Feyerabend, aware of science's embeddedness 
within  ideology  and  historical  conditions,  is 
nevertheless convinced that ideology and science, 
insofar  as  ideology  determines  the  kinds  of 
science being conducted through state 
mechanisms  and  economic  regimes,  can  be 
disentangled–both for the good of societies, where 
"organs of the state should never hesitate to reject 
the judgement of scientists when they have reason 
for doing so," and for that of the sciences, "for a 
science that is run by free agents looks much more 
attractive than the science of today which is run by 
slaves,   slaves   of   institutions   and   slaves   of 
'reason.'"84   However this is not a license to let the 
sciences run free of accountability to society–the 
 
objection that science is self-correcting 
and thus needs no outside interference 
overlooks, first, that every enterprise is 
self-correcting (look at what happened to 
the Catholic Church after Vatican II) and, 
secondly, that in a democracy the self- 
correction of the whole which  tries to 
achieve more humane ways of living 
overrules the self-correction of the parts 
which has a more narrow aim.85 
 
An uncoupling of a state-science complex would 
engender individuals to "accept, live in accordance 
with, and spread ideas as [individuals]" instead of 
making one set of beliefs intrinsically predominant 
to being a citizen of that state.86 
John Stuart Mill provides the basis for 
Feyerab to assert this—On Liberty, which 
Feyerabend cites often throughout his works, is 
based around the thesis of 
 
a society of human beings fully and 
variously developed, morally vigorous, 
self- determining.…[  Mill]    views 
 
83   Ibid. 238. 
84   "How to Defend," 9, 12. 
85   Ibid. 251. 
86 We might imagine that in Feyerabend's vision that 
citizens would have greater control over the use of 
science and industrial engineering within their 
borders–it is evident from constant protests against 
fracking and pipelines, for example, that citizens do 
feel this is necessary already. Feyerabend could not 
foresee the kinds of problems facing the social 
dimension of science today; however, in zero-sum 
situations, such as vaccinations, it is best to accept the 
authority of pharmacists. The same goes for many such 
situations. Feyerabend would only recommend that the 
acceptance of this authority not be blind. 
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democracy with some ambivalence. He is 
committed to equality of moral status, to 
the responsibility of each individual … 
[however] he cherishes 'civil' liberty; he 
wishes, that is to say, to limit the 
authority government over individual 
self-determination.87 
 
Mill states that the power by governments to exert 
coercion is "illegitimate. The best government has 
no more title to it than the worst" to legislate 
norms by which individual beliefs must conform.88 
In Mill's estimation, the official state ideology has 
no legitimate bearing on the beliefs of ordinary 
citizens–or it at least has a heavy burden of proof 
to meet if such bearing will be legitimate–and in 
this respect Feyerabend is fully in line with 
Millian democratic liberty: if democracy as 
formulated by current state structures cannot 
secure individual liberty, so much the worse for 
democracy.89 
Feyerabend further asserts "it would not only 
be foolish but downright irresponsible to accept 
the judgement of scientists and physicians without 
further examination," and that the lay population 
"can and must supervise" the sciences.90 It is in 
this supervision–not by experts within the field or 
through corporate interests, but of ordinary 
citizens–that the sciences would be most fully 
consistent with the freedom of peoples in 
Feyerabend's view, since "science is not beyond 
the natural shrewdness of the human race. I 
suggest that this shrewdness be applied to all 
important social matters which are now in the 
hands of experts."91 The preservation of ways of 
life–not only democratic ones–is to Feyerabend far 
more crucial than preservation of the insights of 
particular systems of knowledge or the 
continuation of certain industrial practices, and 
this oversight has been the cause of much fatal 
imperialism and many suicidal ecological attitudes 
throughout human history. 
For "maximum liberty of thought in the 
society in which we live now, maximum liberty 
not only of an abstract kind, but expressed in 
appropriate institutions and methods of 
teaching,"92 the dogmatisms of epistemology and 
philosophies of science have to be subdued, and 
by receiving "anarchism" into the discussion as a 
possible "medicine" for doing so when the need 
 
87   Skorupski, 338. 
88  John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," John Stuart Mill, 23. 
89  cf. Paul Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society,135. 
90   Ibid. 96. 
91   Ibid. 98. 
92   "How to Defend," 13. 
arises–allowing it to coexist with other 
perspectives–"ideologies must be seen  in 
perspective...[since they can be] deadly when 
followed to the letter."93 Though he does not 
address to any great detail the practical problems 
of getting such a program off the ground, a 
plurality of perspectives, lifestyles and ideologies 
living parallel to one another is in Feyerabend's 
estimation a surer safeguard against the kinds of 
transgressions which can characterize human 
relations especially in the midst of competing 
ideologies. 
The preceding pages have hopefully given an 
accurate account of Feyerabend's thought on 
points relevant to the ideological, imperial and 
economic dimensions of Western science. A 
number of objections have been made to 
Feyerabend's overall approach, as well as the 
interpretations which inform his conclusions. It 
may be the case that he has many more detractors 
than sympathetic readers. His "irrationalist" 
reversals of conventional understanding of science 
articulated through sensational, provocative 
language is a constant point of dispute among 
science journalists, for instance, his understanding 
of John Stuart Mill–a pillar propping up his 
attacks on method–has been taken to task at least 
once as "synchronic and unhistorical, 
insufficiently sensitive to nuance and context."94 A 
1987 Nature article famously categorizes 
Feyerabend as "the worst enemy of science" of the 
time, viewing him as a trivial relativist who "can 
fool a lot of people a lot of the time with 
sophistries like 'anything goes'" but offers no 
substantial insight to the problems of method.95 
Other than being in the opinion of these critics 
basically ignorant of the reality of scientific 
conduct, the substance of Feyerabend's arguments 
has attracted widespread criticism though he 
considers them attacks on occasions in his writing 
where he stops "reasoning and engages in a little 
rhetoric."96 One is his use of "anarchism"  in 
regard to epistemology, which as Rom Harré 
writes, serves 
 
as a parallel between political and 
epistemic anarchy so that the 
abandonment of any and all principles of 
method, including adherence to any basis 
of rationality is treated not only as being 
like political anarchism, but as an integral 
part of an anarchistic standpoint in which 
 
93   Ibid. 2. 
94   Jacobs, 212. 
95  Theocharis and Psimpolous, 596. 
96   Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society 125. 
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all order is abandoned.97 
The same critic contends 
Feyerabend's philosophy of science turns 
on two points: (i) that the very world is 
changed in the radical transitions from 
one set of concepts to another, and that 
the change is brought about by non- 
rational means, by which he means by 
means irreducible to any combination of 
moves in logic;98 (ii) that the whole of 
human culture ought to be taken to be 
available as a resource for the 
advancement of science, in particular 
remote cultures considered primitive or 
even bizarre ought not to be neglected.99 
 
As a consequence of his observations about 
scientific theories breaking with established 
modes of thought, "novel theories are almost 
certainly already refuted by experience and 
experiment when they are born, so that the 
methodology of conjecture and refutation, his 
particular bête noire, could not possibly be applied 
to them" and "[if] we see science as the endeavour 
to construct an adequate conception of the natural 
world," then the kinds of procedures which 
Feyerabend shows us to have actually occurred in 
"the history of science at certain times and places 
of particular importance, is just the kind of method 
that would be called for."100 
Feyerabend draws quite a bit of resistance for 
his idea that separation of church and state 
provides an adequate guide to solving the kinds of 
ideological problems he sees present in the 
sciences. Joseph Agassi, assessing Feyerabend's 
move to separate state from science, concludes the 
analogous "separation of state and church does not 
imply any separation of politics and religion....Let 
us assume that science does have authority, that 
the authority of science exercises power, and that 
at times it does this quite unjustly." Agassi brushes 
this  aside  as  "excessively  naive,"  "[a]  prime 
example…of a case where the scientific authority 
and the political authority are fused, is where the 
state legitimises science and the authority of 
science legitimises the state. This, indeed, ought 
to be prevented." He then asks "[is], then, 
Feyerabend right? No. To the extent that we can 
speak of the authorities of science separately from 
science, then we do need to control them and 
prevent them from misusing their power–on the 
condition that they can and would participate in 
public affairs no less than the Pope....[Separation 
of state and science] is useless."101 
Still further, though Feyerabend's approach 
has admittedly had an "advantage:  it  is a 
discussion within the politics of science. This is 
quite unusual: most writers about science prefer to 
pretend that science and politics do not mix"102, he 
invites refutation for declaring "science an 
intellectual system that competes with other 
intellectual systems, and that its claim for 
superiority to all competitors is but an expression 
of its cultural imperialist tendencies....The option 
that science is not intellectually superior to magic 
is but a teaser. He clearly offered it as a mere 
challenge: he did not consider it seriously."103 
This alludes to passages in Feyerabend where, for 
example, he maintains "Voodoo has a firm though 
still not sufficiently understood material basis, and 
a study of its manifestations can be used to enrich, 
and perhaps even to revise, our knowledge of 
physiology"104 and the demand to "either call 
quarks and Gods equally real" because neither 
have been empirically observed, "but tied to 
different circumstances, or altogether cease talking 
about the 'reality' of things and…use more 
complex ordering schemes instead."105 This is a 
too-frequent criticism by his contemporaries: 
however much they grant the legitimacy of the 
arguments "underlying" his prose, he is simply 
being provocative for its own sake or that he is an 
 
97   Harré, 295. 
98 The point Harré criticizes here is Feyerabend's 
suggestion that the philosophy of science should not be 
treated as any more rigid an activity than ordinary 
process of interpretation we use every day–it is simply 
a hermeneutical practice of understanding science with 
all the ambiguities and diversity of perspectives that the 
hermeneutics involved in reading may have. 
99    Ibid.  Note  that  since  the  1970s  it  has  been 
incrementally more accepted that indigenous 
knowledge indeed should not be neglected, so this is no 
longer a controversial point. 
100   Ibid. 297. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101   Agassi, "The Politics of Science," 44. 
102   Agassi, Popper and His Popular Critics, 67. 
103  Ibid. Feyerabend may have perfectly serious in this 
belief. 
104   Against Method, 36. 
105   Ibid. 89. 
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unremarkable postmodernist.106 
Feyerabend defended himself from criticism 
in countless reply articles published in various 
journals throughout his later life, often reproduced 
in his books–"[State university science 
departments] are financed by taxpayers. They are 
therefore subjected to the judgement of the 
taxpayers and not to the judgement of intellectual 
parasites who live off public money....Experts 
have a vested interest in their own playpens, and 
so naturally they will argue that 'education' is 
impossible without them."107 Positioning his 
arguments against critics he sees wanting to 
preserve "Western oriented history, Western 
oriented cosmology, ie. science" he believes 
“democracy as conceived by its current 
intellectual champions...will never permit the 
complete survival of special cultures."108 
Feyerabend also contends he is not as politically 
radical as his critics assume–"I regard anarchism 
as 'excellent medicine for epistemology and the 
philosophy of science'...[one] takes medicine for 
a time, and then one stops....Anarchism, I say, will 
heal epistemology and then we may return to a 
more enlightened and more liberal form of 
rationality....I am not too enthusiastic about 
political anarchism."109 He frequently, through 
close reading of  reviews about his works, 
determines his critics are "illiterate" without the 
necessary sensitivity to irony, rules of argument or 
basic literary devices. As for criticisms of a 
science unencumbered by political ideology, 
"[just] as all religious traditions in a democratic 
state should have the same rights, all cognitive 
traditions should receive the same conditions for 
 
106 Feyerabend at various times calls Marxism a "stupid 
religion" and seeing as his suspicion of ideology 
potentially or necessarily including ideologies like 
feminism and other leftist theories, one could give 
Feyerabend's arguments a more conservative frame 
than his readers have traditionally given, though it is 
hard to say how far that reading could go (he certainly 
appears at any rate, from surveying his works, to be a 
philosophical classicist who can seemingly find an 
ancient source for just about any modern or postmodern 
assertion). He is deliberately subversive on enough 
points to make categorizing his "school of thought," if 
any, difficult. This cannot be said for very consciously 
anti-patriarchal or anti-capitalist postmodern authors 
who leave little ambiguity as to their political leanings, 
however much ambiguity is left in their prose. To group 
him with postmodernism proper is hasty, and the same 
can of course be said for other thinkers, even ones 
intimately tied with postmodernism, grouped in a 
similar way. 
107   Science in a Free Society,135. 
108   Ibid. 
109   Ibid. 127. 
survival."110 If "scientific results are not only 
influenced but even constituted by values, then we 
must take a new look at the role scientists play in 
our societies."111 It is made evidently clear by his 
views in other areas that it is not in Feyerabend's 
interest to argue for any single, dogmatic solution 
to bringing that about. 
Whatever the flaws in his style or argument, 
the democratizing of science of the kind he calls 
for is not to be overlooked, and is developed in 
detail in Rupert Sheldrake's Seven Experiments 
That Could Change The World which calls for 
"grassroots" science, taken up by ordinary citizens 
with ordinary means, to participate in realms of 
research often ignored by institutional research 
bodies. In it, Sheldrake explains that 
institutionalization in the 19th and 20th centuries 
made amateur science and its concerns–like those 
of Darwin, he argues–more and more fringe while 
professional science and its concerns–along with 
the funds needed to explore evermore expensive 
areas of study–have taken over. His solution is a 
possible relationship between amateurs and 
professionals–"the former having a greater 
freedom to pioneer new areas of research" with the 
latter having "a more rigorous approach," 
expanding and integrating discoveries.112 For this 
purpose he designs his book to appeal to the 
amateur–who in earlier times made significant 
contributions to the sciences–and using 
deliberately "fringe" scientific questions to invite 
readers to try experiments and avenues of research 
which do not require extensive laboratories or any 
elaborate apparatus. He presents such questions as 
whether pets have telepathy as potentially 
worthwhile to explore, or potentially not, to invite 
amateur research and genuine testing of the 
hypotheses which may be outright dismissed by 
more conservatively-minded professional 
scientists. The political implications of non- 
professional individuals researching these 
questions are that it promotes bodies of knowledge 
otherwise "disproven" as legitimately in need of 
first-hand inspection, and that the objectivity of 
institutional science "fundamental to the 
worldview of materialists, rationalists, secular 
humanists, and all others who uphold the 
superiority of science over religion, traditional 
wisdom, and the arts" is opened up to further 
perspectives and findings.113 
In What Is Life?, Erwin Schrödinger, 
considering the physical basis of consciousness, 
 
110   Preston et al., 13. 
111  Feyerabend, "Science and Ideology," 155. 
112   Sheldrake, xv. 
113   Ibid. 165. 
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states a "rationalist may be inclined to curtly deal 
w i t h t h i s q u e s t i o n , r o u g h l y a s 
follows...consciousness is linked up with certain 
kinds of events in organized, living matter, 
namely, with certain nervous functions. How far 
back or 'down' in the animal kingdom there is still 
some sort of consciousness, and what it may be 
like in its early stages, are  gratuitous 
speculations...and thus of no value to 
knowledge."114 He then states this approach 
leaves "an uncanny gap...in [the rationalist] picture 
of the world....[It is] extremely improbable that 
our understanding of the world represents any 
definite or final stage...[by] this I do not mean 
merely that the continuation of our research in the 
various sciences, our philosophical studies and 
religious endeavor are likely to enhance and 
improve our present outlook...[we] may be 
approaching the end of a blind alley, we may even 
have reached it."115  It is as true in this century as 
it was in the last that we simply do not know 
enough to be dogmatists especially with 
implements as potent as the sciences, and our 
survival depends on it–as of 2014 "[an] IPCC 
report reaffirms that the 'vast majority' of known 
fuel reserves must be left in the ground to avert 
intolerable risks to future generations. Meanwhile 
the major energy corporations make no secret of 
their goal  of exploiting these reserves and 
discovering new ones....[The] 'most appropriate 
metaphor for the insanity of our times' is the 
Siachen Glacier, where Indian and Pakistani 
soldiers have killed each other on the highest 
battlefield in the world. The glacier is now 
melting and revealing 'thousands of empty 
artillery shells, empty fuel drums, ice axes, old 
boots, tents and every other kind of waste that 
thousands of warring human beings generate' in 
meaningless conflict."116 
Conclusions 
 
If we grant to Feyerabend that "science as a 
whole is founded on ideology"117 along with his 
exploration of same, we can conclude that there is 
no ideology-free science just as is there is no 
theory-free observation, and attempts to 
understand science as operating somehow outside 
domains shaped by human affairs will meet 
considerable issues. This is not to say politics is 
all there is to life–human existence is as ornate 
and sublime in its dimensions as nature itself. 
 
114   Schrödinger, 93. 
115   Ibid. 94, 103, 104. 
116  Chomsky, "The End of History?" 
117  Feyerabend, "Science and Ideology," 154. 
Feyerabend concludes in Conquest of Abundance 
that the world in which we live is fundamentally 
ineffable, that no word, theory or doctrine has 
scratched its surface. For this reason the sciences 
are needed, art is also needed, literature is needed, 
conversation, songs, games, romance, self- 
exploration, experimentation with psychoactive 
substances, dreaming–none of these are 
distractions or impure methods of uncovering the 
mysteries in which human life is embedded and 
which surround us to depths no mind or 
instrument has ever sounded. These domains do 
not have to be "purified" or raised to the merits of 
the sciences, they have a dignity of their own as 
explorative tools just as cultures have an 
inalienable dignity, even if they are to determined 
after being tried to have failed to uncover anything 
meaningful. 
The work of the sciences makes legitimate 
discoveries and in its long history has provided the 
human race with tremendous abilities and 
knowledge that have made our primate origins 
unrecognizable to us and this is truly remarkable. 
It has also made remarkable cruelty possible in the 
form of genocidal othering of worldviews, in the 
destructive ecological practices it facilitates, in the 
increasingly efficient weapons it continues 
producing to feed military-industrial complexes at 
the expense of innocent lives–science is not like 
the sword in the stone which only obeys its chosen 
hands, it can as be readily manipulated to serve 
what is worst for survival of life on Earth 
including human beings as it can to serve what is 
best. The human race simply does not know 
enough to sacrifice life on Earth to pursue the 
illusions of certainty provided by scientific 
materialism or that of any other belief system. 
A future in which ideology and science, as it 
is recognized today, are fully uncoupled is 
uncertain and may be impossible. By making the 
facilities and the institutions where the sciences do 
their work if  not open to the  layperson, then 
responsible to the layperson, a future where fatal 
mishandlings of scientific knowledge regularly 
occur may be avoided. This is not to say people 
with scientific training should be put out of a 
laboratory position to give laypeople run of it, 
merely to say that in a more integrated and 
transparent society science ought to serve life on 
the planet and the knowledge thereof, and 
ideologies which would have it the opposite way 
would meet with the proper opposition. It may go 
a long way to uncouple the state mechanisms 
which make science subservient to the daily- 
changing needs of economic ideology and turn 
them incrementally towards freeing the 
communities of the world to similar subservience. 
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The sciences are among the greatest 
achievements humanity has mustered against 
vertigo-inducing horizons of uncertainty–to know 
ourselves and our environment is of crucial 
importance, and to allow it to continue playing 
any part in widespread extinction,  
dehumanization, futile global wars, or 
environmental collapse would be a cruel display 
of irony. It is therefore necessary to any future 
worth having that "those who look at the rich 
material provided by history, and who are not 
intent on impoverishing it in order to please their 
lower instincts, their craving for intellectual 
security in the form of clarity, precision, 
'objectivity' [or] 'truth'"118 emerge out of what 
Immanuel Kant describes as self-imposed 
immaturity, "the inability to use one's own 
understanding without another's guidance. [It] is 
self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of 
understanding but in indecision and lack of 
courage to use one's own mind without another's 
guidance....'Have the courage to use your own 
understanding,' is therefore the motto of the 
enlightenment."119 
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